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The Fourth India-Japan 2+2 Dialogue: Institutional Maturity and Emerging Opportunities

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 The Fourth India-Japan 2+2 Dialogue was held in Tokyo on 19 November 2026. India’s Jaishankar and Rajnath Singh met Japan’s Motegi and Koizumi. The ministers pushed for early arrangements on the UNICORN stealth mast, welcomed a firing-range Letter of Intent and a maritime security memorandum, and stressed economic security. Several agreements are still unconcluded.




India's External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Defence Minister Rajnath Singh with Japan's Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi and Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi at the Fourth India–Japan 2+2 Dialogue, Tokyo, 19 November 2026.
India's External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Defence Minister Rajnath Singh with Japan's Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi and Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi at the Fourth India–Japan 2+2 Dialogue, Tokyo, 19 November 2026.

The Fourth India-Japan Foreign and Defence Ministers' Dialogue was held in Tokyo on 19 November 2026, bringing together India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Defence Minister Rajnath Singh with their Japanese counterparts, Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi and Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi. Lasting ninety minutes, the meeting took place two days after the Quad Leaders' Summit in Manila, Philippines. Beyond reaffirming strategic convergence, the dialogue brought the question of implementation to the forefront, particularly in defence-industrial and maritime cooperation. Each successive round has expanded the scope of bilateral engagement, making the central question whether this widening strategic agenda can now be translated into concluded agreements and operational outcomes.


The institutional background


The 2+2 rests on an institutional foundation built over more than a decade. The 2008 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation established the framework for bilateral security engagement, while the elevation of relations to a Special Strategic and Global Partnership in 2014 provided it with a broader political direction. The 2015 agreements on the transfer of defence equipment and technology and the protection of classified military information subsequently created the legal foundations for deeper defence cooperation. A 2+2 dialogue at secretary level had been held since 2010, and the two prime ministers agreed to elevate it to ministerial level at the 2018 annual summit.


The first ministerial round took place in New Delhi on 30 November 2019. Jaishankar and Singh met Motegi, then foreign minister, and Kono Taro, then defence minister. The agenda covered emerging security challenges, maritime security, joint exercises, counter-terrorism and cooperative research. Its principal achievement was institutional: high-level political and defence coordination became a regular feature of the bilateral relationship.


The second round, held in Tokyo on 8 September 2022 with Foreign Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa and Defence Minister Hamada Yasukazu, brought the Quad, cybersecurity, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), 5G and critical minerals into the agenda. This reflected a growing recognition that security cooperation could no longer be confined to conventional defence concerns but increasingly involved technology and economic security.


The third round, held in New Delhi on 20 August 2024 with Foreign Minister Kamikawa Yoko and Defence Minister Kihara Minoru, addressed defence-industrial cooperation, more complex military exercises, space, security cooperation with third countries and the Women, Peace and Security agenda. The ministers also agreed to revise the 2008 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, a process completed in August 2025.


The first three rounds produced a steady widening of subject matter and institutional engagement. With the agenda already considerably broadened, the fourth dialogue placed greater emphasis on advancing existing commitments towards implementation


Defence Minister Rajnath Singh addressing the meeting in Japan
Defence Minister Rajnath Singh addressing the meeting in Japan

What was agreed in Tokyo


The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' meeting summary, the joint statement and Singh's subsequent remarks provide a basis for distinguishing between completed steps, agreed areas of cooperation and arrangements that remain under negotiation.


Defence-industrial cooperation received particular attention. The ministers expressed their expectation for the early formulation of arrangements relating to the transfer of the Unified Complex Radio Antenna (UNICORN), a bilateral project involving the co-development of stealth naval mast technology. They also referred to India's Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) by February 2027. Singh called for the early conclusion of the related agreements and linked the project to the 'Design with Japan, Make in India' framework, alongside broader cooperation in niche, underwater and missile technologies. The language is significant: political support is established but the transfer arrangements have yet to be concluded. The February 2027 expectation therefore provides a specific milestone against which progress can be assessed.


Maritime cooperation showed institutional progress but still requires operational follow-through. The ministers welcomed the Memorandum of Arrangement on Maritime Security Cooperation signed between the two defence authorities in August 2026. They agreed to move towards practical cooperation between the Indian Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force in maritime and air domain awareness (MDA), search and rescue, information sharing and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.


They also affirmed the need to strengthen mine countermeasure capabilities and explore possible joint development in naval shipbuilding and design. Singh separately called for the early conclusion of an arrangement allowing reciprocal access to ship-repair facilities. Such access could improve naval logistics and maintenance flexibility across the Indo-Pacific, particularly for deployments requiring sustained maritime presence. However, the arrangement remains to be concluded.


The maritime dimension was also underscored by Singh's visit to the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force base at Yokosuka on 18 November, alongside Koizumi. The two ministers toured the Mogami-class multi-mission frigate JS Natori, highlighting the growing importance of naval engagement and defence cooperation between the two countries.


Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and Japanese Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi during their visit to Yokosuka Naval Base, 18 November 2026.
Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and Japanese Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi during their visit to Yokosuka Naval Base, 18 November 2026.

On military exercises, the ministers reaffirmed the importance of more complex bilateral and multilateral engagements. The first-ever participation of Japanese Air Self-Defence Force fighter aircraft in India during Exercise Veer Guardian 26 marked an important development in air force cooperation. More significantly, the two sides welcomed the signing of a Letter of Intent towards the utilisation of firing ranges in India by the Japan Self-Defence Forces. This would enable Japanese forces to undertake live-fire training, including exercises involving surface-to-ship missiles, in India for the first time. The ministers agreed to accelerate coordination towards its implementation. The third India-Japan Defence Industries Forum, held in Tokyo in October 2026, further complemented these developments by providing an institutional platform for defence-industry engagement.


The strategic dimension of the dialogue was equally significant. The ministers recognised a shared vision between Japan's Updated FOIP, India's Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) and MAHASAGAR. They also reaffirmed their opposition to unilateral attempts to change the status quo through force or coercion. Motegi and Koizumi outlined Japan's ongoing efforts to revise its three security-related documents: the National Security Strategy, the National Defence Strategy and the Defence Buildup Program. This is relevant to India because changes in Japan's defence posture and transfer policies will shape the scope of future bilateral cooperation.


External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar addressing the 19th India–Japan Foreign Ministers’ Strategic Dialogue.
External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar addressing the 19th India–Japan Foreign Ministers’ Strategic Dialogue.

Economic and technological security also featured prominently. The ministers expressed concern over economic coercion, arbitrary export restrictions and non-market practices that disrupt global supply chains. They welcomed the Joint Declaration on Economic Security Cooperation adopted at the 16th Annual Summit and agreed to promote project-based cooperation in semiconductors, critical minerals, information and communication technology, clean energy and pharmaceuticals. Cooperation on undersea cable networks, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence and space situational awareness further demonstrated the widening relationship between traditional security and technological resilience. Both countries condemned cross-border terrorism and violent extremism, calling for international action against UN-designated groups, including LeT, JeM, Al Qaeda and ISIS.


A particularly significant aspect of the dialogue was Jaishankar's emphasis on the growing weaponisation of economic interdependence. He drew attention to the increasing use of connectivity, resources, services, supply chains and market shares as instruments of geopolitical pressure. This observation reflects India's broader concern that economic dependencies, once viewed primarily through the lens of trade and development, are increasingly becoming strategic vulnerabilities. His remarks also connect with the two countries' shared emphasis on resilient supply chains, diversified economic partnerships and the protection of critical technologies and resources. The emphasis was on to focus on strengthening economic security and deepening G2G, B2B and P2P linkages. For India and Japan, therefore, economic security is no longer a parallel component of their strategic partnership but an increasingly integral part of their wider Indo-Pacific engagement.


Reading the outcome

The dialogue also addressed key regional security developments, including the situation in the East China Sea, the South China Sea and North Korea, including the abductions issue. Singh emphasised the importance of resolving disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law. These discussions reflected the shared interest of both countries in maintaining regional stability, upholding the rules-based international order and ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific.


S. Jaishankar, Rajnath Singh, Toshimitsu Motegi and Shinjiro Koizumi during the Fourth India–Japan 2+2 Dialogue, Tokyo, 19 November 2026.
S. Jaishankar, Rajnath Singh, Toshimitsu Motegi and Shinjiro Koizumi during the Fourth India–Japan 2+2 Dialogue, Tokyo, 19 November 2026.

The partnership's progress can be understood through a neoclassical realist perspective. The increasingly uncertain Indo-Pacific security environment, economic coercion and vulnerabilities in global supply chains constitute systemic pressures encouraging closer India-Japan cooperation. Jaishankar's remarks on the weaponisation of connectivity, resources, services and supply chains further illustrate how economic dependencies have acquired strategic significance. However, external pressures alone do not determine the extent of bilateral cooperation. Their influence is mediated by domestic institutions, political preferences and strategic calculations.


Japan's defence equipment transfer framework and its ongoing review of security policy will shape the scope of defence-industrial cooperation. In India, procurement procedures and domestic approval mechanisms influence the pace at which proposed projects advance. The UNICORN initiative illustrates this interaction: despite political support from both governments, its progression towards transfer remains dependent on the completion of the necessary arrangements and India's anticipated Acceptance of Necessity. These institutional considerations help explain why strategic convergence does not always produce immediate defence-industrial outcomes.


The absence of a formal India-Japan military alliance also shapes the character of this cooperation. Japan's security treaty with the United States and India's preference for strategic autonomy reflect different approaches to regional security, even as both countries share concerns about the Indo-Pacific balance of power. Their partnership consequently advances through issue-based cooperation, institutional coordination and shared strategic interests rather than collective-defence obligations. This arrangement provides considerable flexibility, although it also makes progress dependent on sustained political commitment and the completion of individual initiatives.


Assessment


S. Jaishankar and Toshimitsu Motegi unveil the India–Japan 75th Anniversary Commemorative Logo, Tokyo, 19 November 2026.
S. Jaishankar and Toshimitsu Motegi unveil the India–Japan 75th Anniversary Commemorative Logo, Tokyo, 19 November 2026.

The year 2027 will mark the seventy-fifth anniversary of diplomatic relations between India and Japan. On 19 November 2026, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi unveiled the commemorative joint logo in Tokyo, selected from over 850 public entries, under the theme India–Japan Year of Shared Horizons. The anniversary provides both a symbolic occasion to celebrate bilateral ties and an opportunity to assess their strategic achievements.


For the fourth 2+2, the key benchmarks will be progress on UNICORN, implementation of the firing-range Letter of Intent, operationalisation of the maritime security memorandum and conclusion of the reciprocal ship-repair arrangement. The prolonged discussions over Japan's proposed US-2 amphibious aircraft acquisition, which never resulted in a procurement agreement, underline the difficulties of translating strategic intent into defence-industrial outcomes. UNICORN will therefore be an important test of implementation.


The dialogue's significance will depend not on the expansion of its agenda but on the delivery of tangible outcomes. The 2027 anniversary will offer an opportunity to determine whether India's and Japan's institutional maturity has translated into practical strategic cooperation. The central challenge for India and Japan is to translate their established strategic convergence into sustained, measurable and operational cooperation.


About the Author

Kaveri Jain is a doctoral researcher in International Relations at the Amity Institute of International Studies, Amity University, Noida. Her work focuses on India-Japan relations during the Shinzo Abe era. She has presented at academic conferences, published in peer-reviewed platforms and written on various aspects of India-Japan ties, including foreign policy, technology cooperation, cultural exchange, diaspora diplomacy and engagement in the Indo-Pacific region..

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