Malabar 2026: Four Maritime Powers and a Shared Strategic Vision
Exercise MALABAR 2026 was hosted at Yokosuka, Japan, and concluded on 12 November. It brought together the navies of India, Japan, the United States and Australia. India was represented by INS Sahyadri, an indigenous guided missile stealth frigate. The exercise had a Harbour Phase and a Sea Phase. It strengthens interoperability and trust among the four navies but is not a military alliance and carries no collective defence obligation.
The Japanese port city of Yokosuka hosted Exercise MALABAR 2026, bringing together the navies of India, Japan, the United States, and Australia. Concluding on 12 November, the exercise demonstrated growing maritime cooperation among four major Indo-Pacific powers and their shared interest in maintaining a stable, secure maritime order.
India participated with its indigenous Guided Missile Stealth Frigate, INS Sahyadri, which arrived at Yokosuka Naval Base on 4 November. The exercise comprised two phases: a Harbour Phase, featuring professional interactions and cultural engagements. This was followed by a Sea Phase involving anti-submarine warfare, Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS), maritime interdiction operations, gunnery exercises, replenishment approaches and cross-deck landings.
The Ministry of Defence reaffirmed the participating navies' shared commitment to “maritime cooperation and collective security in the Indo-Pacific”, in consonance with India's MAHASAGAR vision (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions).
From its origins as a bilateral exercise, Malabar has evolved into a significant platform for multilateral maritime cooperation, reflecting the changing strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific.
History of Malabar: From a 1992 Bilateral Drill to a Four-Nation Platform
Initiated in 1992, Malabar began as a bilateral naval exercise between India and the United States. Although suspended following India's nuclear tests in 1998, it resumed after the September 11 attacks, when converging maritime interests renewed defence engagement. The Indian Navy's escort of US commercial vessels through the Strait of Malacca further demonstrated the scope for operational cooperation.
Initially involving relatively simple Passage Exercises (PASSEX), the exercise gradually developed in complexity. The participation of aircraft carriers in 2005 marked an important advancement, while the coordinated humanitarian assistance and disaster relief response following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami demonstrated the potential of maritime cooperation beyond conventional military operations.
A significant expansion took place in 2007, when Japan, Australia and Singapore joined India and the United States for an exercise in the Bay of Bengal. The same year saw the emergence of the Quadrilateral Initiative involving India, Japan, Australia and the United States. However, amid diplomatic sensitivities, Australia withdrew from the initiative, while Australia and Singapore stepped away from subsequent Malabar exercises.
Japan's participation gained continuity following the formal invitation extended through the 2015 India-US summit statement. Australia returned to the exercise in 2020, restoring its present four-country configuration.
Ambassador (Retd.) Yogendra Kumar, in his 2017 lecture The Malabar Exercises and Maritime Security, described the exercise's evolution as a “barometer” of changing regional geopolitics. Its history illustrates how maritime cooperation has developed alongside shifting strategic priorities.
India's Maritime Vision: Moving from SAGAR to MAHASAGAR
India's participation in Malabar is closely linked to its geographical position and economic dependence on maritime connectivity. Its peninsular coastline, together with the Andaman and Nicobar and Lakshadweep Islands, provides strategic access to important sea routes. At the same time, the security of chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and the Strait of Malacca has direct implications for India's trade and energy interests.
As Kumar noted in his 2017 lecture, maritime transport accounted for more than 78 per cent of global trade by volume and over 70 per cent by value. Protecting shipping routes and ensuring maritime stability are therefore essential to India's economic security. India's maritime approach extends beyond naval preparedness to include coastal security, maritime domain awareness, protection of offshore assets and cooperation against conventional and non-traditional threats. Naval exercises, coordinated patrols, intelligence sharing and capacity-building partnerships are all important instruments of this strategy.
This wider outlook was articulated through Prime Minister Narendra Modi's SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision, announced in 2015, which emphasised a safe, secure and stable Indian Ocean Region. It encompassed freedom of navigation, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, cooperation against piracy and maritime terrorism, and the development of regional maritime capacities.
MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions, articulated in 2025, extends this approach towards broader regional and international engagement. It reflects India's emphasis on partnerships that connect security with economic growth and development. Challenges such as climate-related disasters, illegal fishing, piracy and environmental degradation require cooperation beyond naval forces, including through institutions such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). Malabar consequently forms one part of India's broader maritime strategy, complementing its diplomatic, developmental and institutional engagement across the Indo-Pacific.
Is Malabar a Military Alliance? Malabar vs the Quad
The participation of India, Japan, the United States and Australia reflects a convergence of maritime interests, although their strategic priorities are not identical.
For the United States, Malabar strengthens operational coordination with regional partners and supports its wider Indo-Pacific presence. Japan's participation reflects its growing security engagement and its interest in protecting international sea lanes, on which its trade and energy supplies depend. Australia's geographical position between the Indian and Pacific Oceans makes it an important contributor to regional maritime cooperation. India brings the perspective of an Indian Ocean power, with priorities centred on securing maritime approaches, protecting trade and supporting a favourable regional order. Its engagement also reflects the effort to deepen partnerships while retaining strategic autonomy.
The relationship between Malabar and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) is significant but should not be conflated. The Quad is a diplomatic and strategic partnership addressing areas including maritime security, technology, infrastructure and resilient supply chains. Malabar, by contrast, is a naval exercise focused on operational coordination and interoperability. Nor does Malabar constitute a military alliance or impose a formal collective defence obligation. Such exercises strengthen interoperability and shape the strategic environment, but do not eliminate the possibility of strategic hedging by participating countries. The Ministry of Defence's reference to “collective security” therefore signals a shared commitment to maritime cooperation and not a mutual defence treaty.
The strategic foundations of this convergence can be traced to former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, widely regarded as the 'father of the Quad'. Through his 2007 address to the Indian Parliament, Confluence of the Two Seas, and his subsequent advocacy of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), Abe championed closer cooperation between India, Japan, the United States and Australia. His vision helped lay the groundwork for the revival of the Quad in 2017. Although Malabar and the Quad remain distinct, their shared membership and maritime focus reflect the enduring relevance of Abe's Indo-Pacific vision.
Japan's Hosting and the India-Japan Maritime Partnership
Japan's hosting of Malabar 2026 highlights the expanding operational role of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the strengthening of its maritime partnerships across the Indo-Pacific. India and Japan have steadily expanded defence cooperation through institutional dialogues, naval exercises, port visits and joint training engagements. Their shared interests include freedom of navigation, secure sea lanes and stability across the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
INS Sahyadri's visit to Yokosuka offered a visible expression of this partnership. Beyond the operational drills, the Harbour Phase enabled professional interactions, operational synchronisation, cross-deck visits, sporting engagements and cultural engagements. Such exchanges strengthen familiarity and trust among naval personnel, forming an important foundation for effective cooperation at sea. For Japan, hosting the exercise reinforces its contribution to regional maritime security. For India, it provides an opportunity to deepen bilateral naval engagement while strengthening coordination with the United States and Australia.
Conclusion
Malabar's evolution from a bilateral exercise in 1992 to a four-nation maritime platform mirrors the changing strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific. Its significance lies not in the creation of a military alliance but in developing interoperability, professional trust, camaraderie and the capacity to coordinate in response to shared maritime challenges.
For India, the exercise complements its wider maritime vision, from SAGAR to MAHASAGAR. For Japan, hosting the 2026 edition reflects its expanding role in regional maritime cooperation and the growing depth of its partnership with India. As the Indo-Pacific becomes increasingly important to global economic and strategic affairs, Malabar remains one of the most significant expressions of the participating countries' commitment to maritime cooperation and a stable regional order.
About the Author
Kaveri Jain is a doctoral researcher in International Relations at the Amity Institute of International Studies, Amity University, Noida. Her work focuses on India-Japan relations during the Shinzo Abe era. She has presented at academic conferences, published in peer-reviewed platforms and written on various aspects of India-Japan ties, including foreign policy, technology cooperation, cultural exchange, diaspora diplomacy and engagement in the Indo-Pacific region.
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